Mediation can reduce the risk of conflict in situations where the bargaining failure is due to asymmetric information. But if the parties can choose a mediator, will they choose the mediator who seeks to minimize the probability of conflict? In this paper, I consider the endogenous selection of a mediator in a two-person bargaining problem where each party has private information about its relative strength or weakness. I find that the parties choose the ex ante worst one among many interim incentive efficient mediators due to the incentive of each party to avoid seeming weak to their adversary.
Introduction
In many bargaining situations, the failure to reach an agreement by mutual consent results in conflict. Some examples of such conflict are warfare in international relations, strikes in labor disputes, court trials after failed pretrial negotiations, and simply "no deal" in selling or hiring situations. When the source of these conflicts is asymmetric information, mediation can be used to reduce information asymmetries and thus to minimize the risk of conflict. This paper addresses a novel issue: If the parties can choose a mediator among many potential mediators, will they actually choose the mediator who seeks to minimize the probability of conflict? I posit that the information leakage problems that arise during the endogenous selection process ineluctably lead to the choice of a mediator that offers a higher risk of conflict than any other available mediator. Thus mediation can help reduce conflicts, but it only resolves part of the information asymmetry problems that lead to bargaining failures; and the process of selecting a mediator inevitably inhibits the chance of minimal conflict even when it is feasible.
A long tradition of research in both economics and political science has focused on understanding the sources of bargaining failure that might give rise to conflict, and further identifying the optimal institutions to reduce potential conflict.
1 Starting with the seminal work of Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) , a large amount of the literature studies the possibility of a bargaining failure due to asymmetric information. When asymmetric information is a predominate cause of conflict, the bargaining parties can achieve better outcomes by communicating with each other. For example, some possible communication systems (or institutions) are face-to-face dialogue, mediation, and arbitration. Thus many game theorists, and especially international relations scholars, have studied which communication systems are the most effective in reducing the possibility of bargaining failure and conflict.
Although I do not restrict this paper only to conflicts in international relations, it is useful to mention a few works in this area. A significant amount of theoretical work focuses on when and how mediation improves on unmediated communication (e.g., Kydd, 2003; Bester and Wärneryd, 2006; Hafer, 2008; Fey and Ramsay, 2010; Hörner, Morelli and Squintani, 2015) . These contributions assert that mediation can indeed be one of the most effective institutions under certain conditions. Recognizing the analytical power of mechanism design tools, some of the recent research study mediation as mechanisms (e.g., Bester and Wärneryd, 2006; Fey and Ramsay, 2009; Meirowitz et al., 2012; Hörner, Morelli and Squin-of when (and how) does the availability of a single, conflict-minimizing mediator help in reducing the chance of conflict. My analysis is complementary by further asking which mediator would be chosen in bargaining situations with a set of many available mediators and by evaluating how the endogenous selection process can lead to inefficiency in interim bargaining.
Having clarified my general motivation, I now describe the basic features of the underlying bargaining model and the set of mediators from which the players can choose.
To describe the bargaining situations with incomplete information, I use the concept of Bayesian bargaining problem, based on ideas from Harsanyi (1967-8) . In my setting, two players can jointly opt for an agreement outcome, or else a conflict outcome occurs.
The conflict outcome is inefficient in the sense that it leads to social welfare reduction.
Each player has private information about its type, either strong or weak. Such a private information can be thought of as a player's preferences towards outcomes. In particular, the strong type prefers agreement over conflict only with the same type opponent, whereas the weak type always prefers agreement regardless of the opponent's type.
In this strategic setting, the players can communicate through a mediator to reduce information asymmetries, and the mediator is selected at the interim stage. But there are multiple mediators that are available to the players. These mediators are modeled as trustworthy third parties each of whom recommends a bargaining outcome depending on the players' reported types according to a mediation plan (or choice mechanism). In line with most of the mechanism design literature, the mediators are assumed to have no private information, to be unbiased, and to communicate independently and confidentially with each player. Also, the mediators have no independent budget for transfers or subsidies. Further, each mediator is assumed to be fully committed to its mechanism, the objective of whom is not necessarily the minimization of the probability of conflict. In particular, a mediator recommends "conflict" if it is prescribed by the mechanism that he or she is committed to; in other words, the mediator commits to quitting after failing to lead the players to an agreement and does not seek a new mediation plan. Thus the mediators that are available to the players can be characterized by the corresponding mechanisms that give rise to different ex ante probabilities of conflict.
More importantly in the model, each of these available mediators is feasible in the sense that the mediator must guarantee that the players are willing to participate and to reveal their types honestly to the mediator if chosen. That is, I impose interim individual rationality and informational incentive constraints. In the underlying bargaining problem that I consider, the players are given the set of possible bargaining outcomes rather than the set of actions, and the players can resort to the conflict outcome whenever it might be profitable.
In such situations, the interim individual rationality constraints require that the mediator offers each type of each player an expected payoff that is not less than what he could guarantee himself in the conflict outcome. Then the mediator's recommendations induce posterior beliefs of the players so that the players are willing to participate and to voluntarily obey the recommendations, generating the recommended outcome whether it is agreement or conflict. Thus the constraints in my setting entail that the mediator's recommendations are self-enforcing.
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Having concluded the informal description of my model, I describe my method of attacking the problem of mediator selection and offer a preview of my findings.
Because the players select a mediator at the interim stage in which each player knows only his own type, they would reasonably select the feasible mediator that is efficient in an interim sense. I find that there is a continuum of interim (incentive) efficient mediators among which the players could choose. So characterizing interim efficient mediation identifies too large a set of attainable mediators. The important finding in my setting is that the feasible mediator that is best for each player depends on what his type is. In particular, among all of the interim efficient mediators, the unique ex ante efficient mediator is best for the weak type and the ex ante worst mediator is best for the strong type. Then because the players already know their own types at the time they select a mediator, the problem of "information leakage" might arise. That is, advocating for a particular interim efficient mediator might convey information about the player's type. For this reason, the issue of which mediator gets selected is far from trivial.
My goal is to give a stronger prediction of which mediator would be chosen from the considerable range of interim efficient mediators. Thus I consider what requirements might be needed for the more refined solution concept than interim efficiency that reflects the informational concern. First, the choice of a mediator should not reveal private information of the players. That is, no matter what his type is, each player should maintain an inscrutable facade in the selection process.
6 Second, each player should compromise between the conflicting goals of his true type and his other possible type. In my setting, the conflicting incentives of the strong and weak types are captured by their opposite preferences over 5 I further elaborate on the difference between the relevant constraints in Hörner, Morelli and Squintani (2015) , Bester and Wärneryd (2006) , and this paper in Subsection 5.2.
6 The inscrutability principle (Myerson, 1983) asserts that "any information that the players could have revealed during the mechanism-selection process can be revealed instead to the mediator after the mechanism has been selected" (Myerson, 1991, 504-5) .
the interim efficient mediators. I impose the solution concept that exactly captures both the idea of inscrutability and the trade-off between the different types of players, called a neutral bargaining solution (Myerson, 1984b) . This solution concept provides a reasonable prediction of which mediator would be chosen in the bargaining situations with incomplete information considered in this paper.
I can summarize my main findings as follows.
-Which mediator is most likely to arise in the selection process? By choosing from the set of interim efficient mediators, the players can use mediation to reduce information asymmetries and benefit relative to no-communication. Furthermore, the neutral bargaining solution concept prescribes that the players select the ex ante worst mediator among all of the interim efficient mediators. This suboptimal choice is associated with the highest ex ante probability of conflict. This result can be interpreted as the players choosing the "worst among the best." -How does the endogenous selection process lead to inefficiency in bargaining? In the strategic setting that I consider, expressing a preference for the mediator who is known to be better at implementing an agreement might convey information that such player is in a weaker position. Then the strong player will be convinced to immediately force conflict when matched with such seemingly weak player. Therefore, each playerwhether he is strong or weak -will not want the other player to infer via his mediatorchoice that he is weak, even if the probability of the strong type is fairly small. Thus the players, being afraid of seeming weak to their adversary in the mediator-selection process, would choose the mediator that is most favorable to the strong type. Therefore, the selection of such mediator leads to ex ante inefficiency.
One implication of my results is that ex ante efficiency can be seriously misleading as a solution concept in interim bargaining where the players have private information. Within the class of bargaining situations with incomplete information considered in this paper, ex ante efficiency is feasible but the players do not choose the mediator that maximizes the ex ante efficient gains. Therefore, ex ante efficiency might not be the right welfare measure for evaluating mediation and other possible institutions. Further, my paper underlines the analytical power of the neutral bargaining solution as an interim bargaining solution concept.
My results also imply that mediation is indeed useful in reducing bargaining failure but not as much as I could hope for when the mediator-selection process is endogenous.
Therefore, I re-examine the sources of bargaining failure. The consideration of the conflictminimizing mediator may prescribe mediation as the most effective institution in reducing the possibility of bargaining failure to the fullest. But such analysis misses an important feature that several different mediators can be available to the disputing parties. In my setting, the parties choose the mediator that offers a higher risk of bargaining failure than many of the available alternatives. In this sense, my paper contributes a new idea to the debate over the sources of bargaining failure: The process of selecting a mediator itself creates an inherent inefficiency and bargaining failure in interim bargaining.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 introduces my basic model of bargaining situations with mediator selection; section 3 characterizes the efficient mediators and describes the important features of these mediators; section 4 displays the key results in terms of which mediator is chosen and how inefficiency arises; section 5 provides a number of discussions that are relevant to the results and possible extensions; the final section briefly summarizes the results. All of the proofs are in Appendix A.
The Bargaining Setting with Mediator Selection
My discussion of bargaining situations with incomplete information uses the concept of Bayesian bargaining problem proposed by Harsanyi (1967-8) and further analyzed for the fixed-threats case by Harsanyi and Selten (1972) and Myerson (1979 Myerson ( , 1984b .
7 In particular, I consider mediator selection by two players in bargaining problems of the following kind.
The two players can cooperate on an agreement outcome that is jointly feasible for the players together, or else a conflict outcome occurs in the absence of cooperation. 8 The utility payoffs that the two players receive from either the outcome of agreement or conflict depend on both players' private types. Each player can be of type s or w, privately and independently drawn from the same distribution with probability p and (1 − p) respectively. Each type represents a player's preferences towards the agreement and conflict outcomes. 9 In particular, a type s 7 A Bayesian bargaining problem differs from a Bayesian game in that a set of jointly feasible outcomes is given instead of a set of actions or strategies for each player with the specification of a conflict outcome that the players must get by default if they fail to cooperate. The fixed-threats case and the variable-threats case under complete information are considered in the classical works by Nash (1950 Nash ( , 1953 . Harsanyi and Selten (1972) notes that "[the] fixed-threats case is clearly appropriate for many purely economic situations [...but] the variable-threats case is appropriate for most military situations" (81). For example, a failure to reach agreement in international conflicts can result in not only war but also stalemate. However considering the possibility of stalemate only makes the problem theoretically more subtle. Therefore the bargaining games with fixed-threats in my paper can be considered simple enough to avoid theoretical subtlety but at the same time it subsumes various applications not only restricted to international relations.
8 The conflict outcome (Myerson, 1984b, 462) is also referred to as the conflict point (Harsanyi and Selten, 1972, 83) or the disagreement outcome (Myerson, 1991, 266) .
9 Alternatively, each type can be interpreted as a player's strengths, capabilities, or endowments that lead to such preferences towards the outcomes of agreement and conflict.
prefers agreement to conflict only with a type s opponent, whereas a type w always wants agreement regardless of the opponent's type; but the conflict outcome is socially inefficient in the sense that it shrinks the sum of the two players' payoffs relative to the agreement outcome for any type combination. In this class of games, I refer to type s as the strong type and to type w as a weak type.
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To formally define the above considerations, I shall introduce the following notation. Let D = {d 0 , d 1 } be the set of feasible bargaining outcomes available to the two players where d 0 is the conflict outcome and d 1 is the agreement outcome. For each player i, T i = {s, w} is the set of possible types t i , and p is the marginal probability of the strong type, which is common for both players. Let T = T 1 × T 2 denote the set of all possible type combinations w, w) . Then these parameters satisfy υ ss > 0, υ ww > 0, υ ws > 0, υ sw < 0, and υ sw + υ ws > 0. Let Γ denote the bargaining setting of interest, as described above.
Note that I consider only one feasible agreement outcome. This restriction substantially simplifies the exposition while conveying all the key insights for the problem of mediator selection. Suitable versions of the results continue to hold when I allow for players to adopt any one of several possible agreement outcomes as long as the properties of the type-dependent utilities hold for each agreement outcome against the fixed conflict outcome. I will comment briefly on multiple agreement outcomes in Subsection 5.3.
In the class of Bayesian bargaining problems characterized by Γ, the players can agree on some mediator who commits to a decision rule (or a direct-revelation mechanism) that specifies how the choice d ∈ D should depend on the players' types. That is, a mediator, if chosen, mediates in the following form: first, each player is asked to separately and confidentially report his type to the mediator; then, after getting these reports, the mediator recommends an outcome to the players according to its mechanism. Formally, a mechanism is defined as a function µ : D × T → R such that c∈D µ(c|t) = 1 and µ(d|t) ≥ 0 for all d ∈ D and for all t ∈ T . That is, a mediator with mechanism µ recommends the agreement outcome with probability µ(d 1 |t) and recommends the conflict outcome with probability µ(d 0 |t) if t were the combination of types reported by the players. However, mediators in the real world do not literally recommend conflict, therefore µ(d 0 |t) can be interpreted as the rate of failure in leading the players to an agreement for each report t. By restricting my attention to the symmetric mediators, I can simplify the notation by letting q S = µ(d 0 |s, s),
, and q W = µ(d 0 |w, w). Thus any one of the several possible mediators potentially available to the players can be formally identified with its mechanism µ q that is defined as a triplet q = (q S , q M , q W ). Therefore, I often use µ q to refer to the mediator that offers µ q .
Before continuing further, it is useful to point out a neat connection between the model by Hörner, Morelli and Squintani (2015) (HMS henceforth) and my setting. HMS study how the mediator who seeks to minimize the probability of conflict can improve upon unmediated communication. Because they are interested in that particular mediator, they look at a slightly richer environment than I do; richer in the dimension that the type-dependent surplus-split proposals by the mediator are also considered. What I am interested in is a complementary question regarding the choice of a mediator itself when the players are given a family of feasible mediators, each associated with different probabilities of conflict. To focus on the problem of mediator selection, I abstract away from the optimal split recommendations that minimize the probability of conflict, but rather focus on just the recommendations for an agreement or not that are efficient. To make a headway on this problem, I model the strategic setting as a Bayesian bargaining problem, which is simple in the sense that there are no split proposals but is very closely related to HMS in the sense that the similar informational incentives of the players arise. Now in order to characterize the mediators that are feasible for the players, I need to take into account the incentive constraints relevant in my setting. First note that because the types are unverifiable, a player might be tempted to lie about his type to the mediator whenever such a lie might be profitable. Any mediator's mechanism cannot be implemented unless the players are given incentives to reveal their types honestly. Formally, a mechanism µ q is incentive compatible if and only if it satisfies the following informational incentive constraints:
The left-hand-sides are the expected utilities for the strong type and the weak type respectively, given that both players report their types honestly, if µ q is implemented. The right-hand-sides are the expected utilities for the strong type and the weak type respectively, if he lies about his type in implementing µ q while the other player remained honest.
Also note that the players get the conflict outcome if they fail to cooperate on the agreement outcome, and any player can force the conflict outcome whenever it might be profitable. Therefore, any mediator's mechanism cannot be implemented unless it offers each type of each player an expected utility that is not less than what he could guarantee himself without any cooperation from anyone else in the conflict outcome. Formally, a mechanism µ q is individually rational if and only if it satisfies the following participation constraints:
That is, no type would expect to do worse under the mechanism µ q than in the conflict outcome, and thus the players should be willing to participate in the mechanism.
Therefore, taking the relevant incentive constraints into account, I define the feasible mediator for the players in a Bayesian bargaining problem Γ to be a mediator whose mechanism µ q is both incentive compatible and individually rational in the sense of conditions (2.1) and (2.2). By the revelation principle (Myerson, 1979) , there is no loss of generality in focusing on incentive compatible and individual rational mechanisms. Thus I can naturally assume that the rational intelligent players themselves should be able to choose from the set of all feasible mediators.
Importantly, the constraints (2.1) and (2.2) do not imply that the feasible mediators in my setting have enforcement power. In fact, the interim participation constraints (2.2) coincide with the ex-post participation constraints in the Bayesian bargaining problem Γ (with no moral hazard). I relegate the detailed discussions on this matter to Subsection 5.2.
The Efficient Mediation
Given the set of feasible mediators, the concepts of efficiency under the mechanism design approach can be applied to identify a set of "optimal" mediators among which the players should reasonably choose from. 
and at least one inequality is strict. When each player's type is private information, once the players know their own types, then they should choose an IIE mediator. Therefore my formal analysis on which mediator would be chosen by the two players begins by fully characterizing the set of (symmetric) IIE mediators for Γ.
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The model has many parameters: p, υ ss , υ sw , υ ws , and υ ww . To simplify the formula, I
describe all of the results in terms of three statistics:
The parameter ρ > 0 is the strong/weak type odds ratio; ν s > 0 measures the strong type's value of conflict against a weak type relative to its value of agreement with a strong type, and ν w > 0 measures the weak type's value of agreement with a weak type relative to its value with a strong type. With these parameters, the constraints (2.1) and (2.2) can be rewritten as:
where (3.2) and (3.3) are the incentive compatibility (IC) constraints for the strong and weak types respectively; and (3.4) and (3.5) are the individual rationality (IR) constraints for the 11 The idea of interim incentive efficiency was first introduced in Holmström and Myerson (1983) . Ledyard and Palfrey (2007) use this concept to fully characterize interim efficient mechanisms for the class of linear independent environments.
12 Note that the set of (symmetric) ex ante incentive efficient mediators is a subset of the set of (symmetric) IIE mediators. strong and weak types respectively.
Recall that a mediator can be entirely defined by the probability weights (q S , q M , q W ) that he puts on the outcomes of agreement and conflict for each type realization. The following proposition gives a complete characterization of the symmetric IIE mediators for Γ. Proposition 1. For ρ < ν s + ν w , there is a continuum of symmetric IIE mediators. In particular, any mediator such that q = (q S , q M , q W ) satisfies the following characteristics is IIE:
For ρ ≥ ν s + ν w , there is a unique IIE mediator such that (q S , q M , q W ) = (0, 0, 0). Proposition 1 immediately implies that when the proportion of the strong type is sufficiently high (i.e., ρ ≥ ν s + ν w ), there is only one IIE mediator. This mediator always recommends agreement regardless of the type reports. Therefore, the intriguing cases of mediator selection would occur only when ρ < ν s + ν w , which I will focus on hereafter.
I now elaborate on some observable features of the probability weights (q S , q M , q W ) in the characterizations of the IIE mediators. First, any IIE mediator must recommend agreement with probability one (i.e., q W = 0) to the weak dyad. This is because setting q W = 0 maximizes the weak type's interim expected payoff without affecting the strong type's interim expected payoff; while it relaxes the constraints (3.2), (3.3), and (3.5), without affecting the constraint (3.4) for given q S and q M . With q W = 0, the weak type's IR constraint (3.5) is always satisfied with strict inequality for any q M ∈ [0, 1] because ν w > 0. Second, taking into account that q W = 0, any IIE mediator must recommend conflict with the lowest possible probability q S to the strong dyad. This is because setting q S as low as possible maximizes the strong type's interim expected payoff without affecting the weak type's interim expected payoff, while q S must satisfy the weak type's IC constraint (3.3) given q M . Rearranging (3.3) gives q S ≥ q M (1 − ν w /ρ). So the lowest possible q S is zero for ρ < ν w and is q M (1 − ν w /ρ) for ρ ≥ ν w . With either q S , the strong type's IC constraint (3.2) is always satisfied for any q M ∈ [0, 1]. Lastly, raising q M increases the strong type's interim expected payoff while it decreases the weak type's interim expected payoff. Therefore a mediator with any q M ≥ 0 would be IIE as long as q M , together with q W = 0 and q S = max{0, q M (1 − ν w /ρ)}, satisfies the strong type's IR constraint (3.4). Rewriting (3.4) gives q M ≥ 1 − (ρ/ν s )(1 − q S ). This condition is always satisfied for any q M ≥ max{1 − ρ/ν s , 0} if q S = 0, which corresponds to cases (a) and (b); and for any
which corresponds to cases * (b) and (c).
The reasoning behind these characterizations can be intuitively explained as follows. For cases in which the proportion of the strong type is low (i.e., ρ < ν s ), any symmetric IIE mediator must recommend conflict with some positive probability bounded above zero to the mixed dyads. To gain some intuition for this case, suppose that ρ is very small, say near zero, and that one player is a strong type. Then she would be almost sure that the opponent is a weak type; and so she would be tempted to instigate conflict rather than participate in mediation because her expected net gain from conflict against a weak type is higher than her expected net loss from conflict against a strong type (ρ < ν s ↔ (1 − p)(−υ sw ) > pυ ss )).
Thus exactly because the strong type is rare, even the mediator who seeks to minimize the probability of conflict should trigger conflict for the mixed dyads to induce the strong-type player's participation.
For cases in which the proportion of the strong type is relatively intermediate (i.e., ν w ≤ ρ < ν s + ν w ), a symmetric IIE mediator must also prescribe conflict with positive probability q S > 0 to the strong dyad when it recommends conflict with positive probability q M > 0 to the mixed dyads. This prescription is necessary to prevent the weak type from reporting dishonestly that he is strong. Intuitively, when ρ ≥ ν w the weak type's expected net gain from agreement with a strong type is higher than that with a weak type (ρ ≥ ν w ↔ pυ ws ≥ (1 − p)υ ww ); if a mediator recommends conflict to the mixed dyads with a positive probability while never recommending conflict to the strong dyad, then the weak type would have an incentive to report its type as strong and to receive an agreement recommendation for sure if the other player happens to be a strong type. Therefore, when a mediator puts a positive probability q M then it must also put some positive probability q S to maintain feasibility (satisfying the weak type's IC constraint), but must also set this q S as low as possible (making the weak type's IC constraint bind for a given q M ) in order to be interim incentive efficient.
The only difference between (1) and (2) in Proposition 1 is that for * (b) in (2), an IIE mediator must respect both that the weak type has an incentive to report dishonestly if q S is not high enough when q M > 0, and that the strong type has an incentive not to participate if the mediator does not choose conflict with a sufficiently high q M ; on the other hand, for
, an IIE mediator with q M > 0 does not need to be concerned about any incentive constraint because all of the constraints are slack.
More importantly, the goal of this paper is to develop a formal definition of the mediatorchoice for any bargaining problem of the form Γ. In bargaining situations with incomplete information, when the players select a mediator at the interim stage in which they already know their own private information, the players would reasonably choose a mediator that is efficient in the interim sense. However the concept of interim incentive efficiency identifies too large a set of attainable mediators for ρ < ν s + ν w . This range then begs an important theoretical question of whether I can determine a smaller set. Before answering this question, it will be useful to mention three important features that describe each IIE mediator.
For each ρ given ν s and ν w , the symmetric IIE mediators can be strictly ordered according to the ex ante probability of conflict, the ex ante expected utility, and the interim expected utility. Let Q(µ q ) denote the ex ante probability of conflict induced by µ q with q = (q S , q M , q W ):
Also let U (µ q ) denote the ex ante expected utility in µ q for any player:
Note that U (µ q ) is linear in υ ss > 0, υ sw + υ ws > 0, and υ ww > 0. Recall that q S is either zero or increases in q M , and q W = 0 for any IIE mediator. Consequently (3.6) and (3.7)
show that a higher q M increases Q(µ q ) while it decreases U (µ q ). Lastly, let U (µ q |s) and U (µ q |w) denote the interim expected utilities in µ q for the strong type and the weak type respectively. That is, for any player:
Then for any two symmetric IIE mediators µ q and µ q , if (and only if) µ q gives a higher interim expected utility to the strong type than µ q , then µ q must give a lower interim expected utility to the weak type than µ q . Otherwise, µ q would be interim Pareto superior to µ q , which implies a contradiction in that µ q is not IIE. These considerations imply the following proposition.
U (µ q |s) < U (µ q |s), and U (µ q |w) > U (µ q |w).
Proposition 1 characterizes all symmetric efficient mediators in the interim sense that the players can choose among; Proposition 2 implies that interim preferences of the strong and weak types over these mediators can be strictly ordered in the opposite way. I summarize the key qualitative characteristics of the two extreme IIE mediators as follows:
Corollary 1. For each ρ < ν s + ν w , among all symmetric IIE mediators:
• The mediator with the lowest q M is associated with the lowest ex ante probability of conflict and is a unique ex ante incentive efficient mediator that gives the highest interim payoff for the weak type and the lowest interim payoff for the strong type.
• The mediator with the highest q M is associated with the highest ex ante probability of conflict, is ex ante Pareto inferior to any other IIE mediator, and gives the highest interim payoff for the strong type and the lowest interim payoff for the weak type.
Corollary 1 states that there is a unique ex ante incentive efficient mediator. Although HMS consider a slightly different setting briefly described in Section 2, their best mediator that minimizes the ex ante probability of conflict would be equivalent to the unique ex ante incentive efficient mediator in my setting. Then one might naively consider that the players would find it focal to choose the unique mediator that minimizes the ex ante probability of conflict. But if a player expresses his preference for this mediator, then it might be giving information to the other side that he is in a weaker position because the weak type prefers the ex ante incentive efficient mediator over any other IIE mediator. Therefore, there is no reason a priori to expect that the ex ante incentive efficient solution will be chosen by the privately-informed parties. Then it is also not obvious which one would be chosen among many IIE mediators. To get the strongest possible predictions of mediator selection, I must use yet another solution concept than efficiency that reasonably refines the set of IIE mediators.
Mediator Selection: Failure of Ex Ante Efficiency
In this section, I show that the solution concept, called a neutral bargaining solution (Myerson, 1984b) , selects a unique mediator among all symmetric IIE mediators, and further elaborate on how mediator selection leads to inefficiency. But before continuing, I shall invoke the advantage of using the cooperative solution concepts generally for the problem of mediator selection; and I also articulate that the particular cooperative concept of the neutral bargaining solution is a natural and theoretically appealing way to select a unique mediator as the solution for my mediator-selection problem.
If I build the mediator-selection process explicitly into an ad hoc extensive form game, then I should be able to describe the equilibrium correspondence of this game. Unfortunately, the results of this analysis might depend very strongly on the precise form of the game and might be driven by its details. Also, in many settings, the procedures of mediator-selection are often amorphous and the exact protocols of the selection stage are not always precisely stipulated. The cooperative framework abstracts away from these procedural details, and instead delineates the properties of the bargaining outcomes that are robust to variations in the procedure. Thus the cooperative solution concepts without a precisely defined structure for the actual mediator-selection game can ably make predictions of reasonable mediator choices.
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Particularly in the strategic bargaining setting characterized by Γ, Proposition 1 characterizes a continuum of symmetric IIE mediators among which the players can choose;
Corollary 1 then asserts that the feasible mediator that is best for the strong type is the extreme opposite to the feasible mediator that is best for the weak type. When the feasible mediator that is best for each player depends on what his type is, the inscrutability principle (Myerson, 1983) implies that no matter what type each player might be, he cannot choose the one that is best for him unless the other player believes that both types would have "inscrutably" selected the same mediator without sharing any information during the selection process. If a player selects in a scrutable way, then the other player might learn something about him that could be detrimental. Thus a reasonable interim bargaining solution should
13 Harsanyi and Selten (1972) first explored the question of how to define "reasonable" bargaining solutions in games with incomplete information. Other attempts were made in the seminal works by Myerson (1983 Myerson ( , 1984a . Several other authors have addressed the issue of information leakage in mechanism selection games or the robustness of the optimal mechanisms (e.g., Holmström and Myerson, 1983; Lagunoff, 1995; Cramton and Palfrey, 1995; Laffont and Martimort, 2000; Celik and Peters, 2011) ; Most of these work consider a pairwise comparison between a fixed status quo mechanism (or default game) and an alternative mechanism. My question of mediator selection can be posed as asking which mechanism would be chosen in the first place as the initial status quo mechanism among an infinite number of efficient mechanisms.
be a non-revealing kind of solution by itself.
This consideration conversely implies that any mediator that was being excluded from the set of non-revealing bargaining solutions is excluded by the logic that took into account the possibility of revealing information during the bargaining process. That is, there might be some mediators that are not expected to be selected by the players in such an inscrutable process precisely because some players might choose to reveal information about their types instead of letting those mediators be selected. Therefore, due to the conflicting incentives of different possible types of the same player, a player must make some sort of compromise between what he really wants and what he might have wanted if his type had been different.
The concept of Myerson's (1984b) neutral bargaining solution captures exactly the idea of this inscrutable intertype compromise. In fact in my setting, the conflicting incentives of the two different types, strong and weak, are well-defined in terms of their strict preference orderings over all symmetric IIE mediators. Therefore the application of the neutral bargaining solution concept is particularly pertinent to my setting and also suitable for giving a stronger refinement on the set of IIE mediators. Importantly, Myerson (1984b) establishes the existence of the neutral bargaining solutions for any finite two-person Bayesian bargaining problem, yet the uniqueness is not guaranteed.
The neutral bargaining solution is a generalization of the Nash bargaining solution for two-person bargaining problems with incomplete information. The neutral bargaining solution can be derived from three axioms: a probability-invariance axiom, an extension axiom, and a random-dictatorship axiom. I omit detailed expositions of these axioms because they can be found in Myerson (1984b) ; in short, the probability-invariance axiom is to rule out Harsanyi and Selten's (1972) solution, the extension axiom is a stronger version of Nash's (1950) axiom of independence of irrelevant alternatives, and the random-dictatorship axiom is a similar kind of Nash's (1950) symmetry axiom. What is essential here is that these axioms take into account the inscrutable intertype compromise.
More importantly, the characterization theorems in Myerson (1984b) offer the most tractable set of conditions for computing neutral bargaining solutions. I relegate the exposition of these conditions, appropriately modified to fit into my class of bargaining situations, to the appendix, because its application involves some subtle analysis and quite cumbersome formulas. In the following proposition, I describe the probability weights on conflict q = (q S , q M , q W ) of the symmetric IIE mediator selected by the neutral bargaining solution that I call the NBS mediator.
Proposition 3. The neutral bargaining solution determines a unique mediator that would be selected by the two players. The chosen mediator's mechanism µ q displays the following characteristics for ρ < ν s + ν w :
; q M = 1; and q W = 0.
Proposition 3 states that, for the class of environments in my framework, the concept of the neutral bargaining solution gives a unique prediction of which mediator should reasonably arise as an outcome of the mediator-selection process. In particular, among all of the IIE mediators characterized by Proposition 1, the players would inscrutably demand the IIE mediator who always triggers conflict to the mixed dyads (q M = 1) and who also recommends conflict with the highest corresponding probability to the strong dyad when the weak type has the incentive to exaggerate strength in order to achieve agreement when faced with a strong type.
The reasoning for this result can be gained by considering the inscrutable intertype compromise as briefly outlined. In the bargaining situations that I consider, expressing a preference for the ex ante incentive efficient mediator, who is known to be the best at implementing an agreement outcome, might convey information that such player is in a weaker position. The strong player will be convinced to immediately force the conflict outcome when matched with the weak player. Therefore, each player -whether strong or weak -would not want the other player to infer via his mediator choice that he is weak. In a sense, the strong player would be very eager to reveal her type, whereas the weak player would not want to reveal but rather conceal his type. A weak-type player in particular must respect this intertype compromise and so would have to mimic the strong type -by doing what the strong type would do -to maintain inscrutability. Surprisingly, even if the proportion of the strong type is fairly small, the strong type would implicitly be more influential on the players' behavior in selecting a mediator. Thus each player, being afraid of seeming weak in the selection process, would choose the mediator that is most favorable to the strong type, never revealing their types during bargaining. As stated in Corollary 1, what is best for the strong type is the mediator with the highest q M .
These deliberations directly lead to the main argument of this paper, in which the proof is immediate from Proposition 3 and Corollary 1. I remark on two implications of Theorem 1 with a graphical illustration.
First, Theorem 1 suggests that the players do not choose the mediator who minimizes the probability of conflict but rather choose the one that offers a higher risk of conflict than do many of the alternatives. The implication is that the selection of a mediator can be twisted toward ex ante inefficiency by the incentive of each player to avoid seeming weak to their adversary. That is, in a model where an ex ante efficient outcome (that minimizes the probability of conflict) is technically feasible, the players do not choose the mediator that maximizes the ex ante efficient gains, and so they systematically do worse than ex ante efficiency. The class of benchmark models in this paper is well-identified for showing clearly how ex ante efficiency can go wrong in interim bargaining. Moreover, the uniqueness of the chosen mediator further justifies the neutral bargaining solution as a powerful interim bargaining solution concept in this class. In this sense, ex ante efficiency might not be the right welfare measure for evaluating mediation.
Another interesting implication of Theorem 1 concerns the sources of bargaining failure.
Much of the literature on mediation explores the role of mediation in reducing bargaining failure due to information asymmetries and identifies conditions where mediation can be effective in influencing outcomes. 14 Going further, the key insight of my paper comes from noticing the fundamental nature of bargaining itself -that mediators are actually chosen endogenously by the disputing parties themselves. My analysis ably offers another yet more novel explanation for the sources of inefficiency in bargaining: the mediator-selection process. That is, when the selection process is endogenous, the parties cannot avoid inherent inefficiency and bargaining failure.
14 For example, Kydd (2003) argues that for mediation to be effective, the mediator must be biased and endowed with some independent knowledge on the private information of the disputants. Fey and Ramsay (2010) show that mediation cannot improve on unmediated communication if a mediator does not have access to exogenous sources of information beyond what the disputants relay to them in the case of private values. In the case of interdependent values, Hörner, Morelli and Squintani (2015) show that mediation improves on unmediated communication when the intensity of conflict is high or when asymmetric information is large; more importantly, mediation with enforcement power is no more effective than mediation without. In contrast, Bester and Wärneryd (2006) show that mediation with enforcement power can reduce the probability of conflict when the costs of conflict are high.
Discussion

Is Mediation Not Effective Then?
The argument in Theorem 1 does not imply that mediation is not effective. Because the focus of this paper is not on the comparison between different communication mechanisms, I do not consider unmediated communication. Nonetheless, the revelation principle implies that unmediated communication cannot improve the probability of agreement over mediation.
Further, the general tenor of my results suggests that the parties can do better with mediation compared to no communication but that they select the ex ante worst one among the interim best ones that are possibly feasible. To see this more clearly, refer to Figure 1 that illustrates the ex ante probability of agreement associated with all symmetric IIE mediators (1−Q(µ q )) for the case of ν s > ν w . In this figure, the ex ante probability of agreement induced by the ex ante worst mediator is emphasized by the solid line; and the gray-shaded area corresponds to the agreement probabilities associated with all of the other IIE mediators. Figure 1 also depicts, by the dashed line, the ex ante probability of agreement achieved in the equilibrium that minimizes the probability of conflict in any Bayesian game without communication that is subsumed by the Bayesian bargaining problem Γ. I refer to this equilibrium as the best equilibrium without communication. Note that HMS exclude the cases where war (conflict) can always be averted in the "best" equilibrium that minimizes the ex ante probability of conflict (λ ≥ γ); in this best equilibrium the peace (agreement) probability is one, and the "best" mediator that minimizes the probability of conflict achieves a peace probability of one. Translated into my setting, this region corresponds to ρ ≥ ν s in which both the best equilibrium without communication and the conflict-minimizing mediator (the ex ante incentive efficient one) also achieve the agreement probability of one;
17 Further when ρ < ν s , communication through any IIE mediator strictly improves on the best equilibrium without communication, resonating with the general implications of HMS' results. However, in their comparison, they only consider the conflict-minimizing mediator. My result is stronger in the sense that the parties actually would not choose my version of this conflict-minimizing mediator but will select the ex ante worst mediator who is associated with the highest ex ante probability of conflict among all of the IIE mediators; and even so, the parties can do better with this suboptimal choice compared to no-communication.
Of note is that my analysis also examines the cases of ν s ≤ ρ < ν s + ν w . In this region, the conflict-minimizing mediator yields the same probability of agreement as the best equilibrium without communication; however, other IIE mediators including the ex ante worst one only improve on some other equilibria (not depicted in Figure 1 ). But this comparison is not meaningful in my analysis as the focus is on the problem of mediator selection when the players can possibly choose among many mediators. That is, the fact that the chosen mediator (the ex ante worst one) does strictly worse than the best equilibrium, which is one equilibrium that the players could end up among many possible equilibria in the game without communication, cannot imply that mediation is bad. Thus I only exclude the cases when ρ ≥ ν s + ν w where there is only one IIE mediator.
Incentive Constraints and Mediator's Enforcement Power
When HMS consider mediation they require interim incentive compatibility (both informational and strategic) and ex-post individual rationality constraints. Their IC constraints assert that no player has an incentive to report its type dishonestly to the mediator, and that no player has an incentive to disobey the mediator's optimal split-proposals; and their IR constraints entail both types to find the proposed split (whenever recommended by the mediator) better for them than conflict given what they have learned from the mediator's recommendation. On the other hand, Bester and Wärneryd (2006) (BW henceforth) require interim incentive compatibility (only informational) and interim individual rationality constraints. That is, BW's constraints only require that both types are willing to participate in mediation and to report honestly to the mediator.
HMS and BW consider similar bargaining environments where a mediator recommends the optimal surplus-splits; but in HMS' mediation game each party has an inalienable right to control his action, whereas in BW's mediation game the parties can delegate controls of their actions to some external actors (or to the mediator itself). In such environments with different requirements, the HMS constraints imply that the mediator's recommendations are self-enforcing, whereas the BW constraints imply that the mediator has enforcement power or that the parties are restricted by binding contracts. I require the constraints (2.1) and (2.2) that may look more similar to those in BW than in HMS. However my constraints do not directly entail that the feasible mediators have enforcement power. The reason is essentially because the environments in BW and HMS are different from the bargaining setting that I consider.
Note that the revelation principle asserts that a mechanism cannot be implemented unless it is incentive compatible, but the requirements for incentive compatibility hinge on the underlying bargaining problems. In particular, in a Bayesian bargaining problem where the players are given the set of possible bargaining outcomes rather than the set of actions or strategies, there is no longer any question of the players disobeying recommended actions.
In such situations with no moral hazard, the strategic incentive constraints must be dropped from the definition of incentive compatibility (as in (2.1)) and, in their place, the participation constraints (2.2) must be added. Therefore the conditions (2.1) and (2.2) are natural requirements for characterizing the feasible mediators in my setup of bargaining problems with the conflict outcome as the threat-point. In fact, the conditions (2.2) assert that any type of any player should be willing to participate in µ q , in which the players would subsequently have no choice but to "voluntarily" implement the recommendations of the mediator.
In this sense, the mediator's recommendations are self-enforcing.
To gain some more intuition, suppose that a mediator recommends the agreement outcome d 1 with probability (1 − q S ) to the strong dyad, with probability (1 − q M ) to the mixed dyads, and with probability (1 − q W ) to the weak dyad. Then if recommended d 1 , a strongtype player would learn that the other player is strong with probability
, and that the other player is weak with probability
. Similarly for a weaktype player, his updated beliefs are
that the other player is strong and weak respectively. Then whenever the mediator recommends d 1 , both types find d 1 better for them than d 0 given these posterior beliefs induced by q = (q S , q M , q W ). This is because the constraints (2.2) on q directly imply that the following conditions hold:
respectively. The left-hand-sides of (5.1) are the posterior expected payoffs for the strong and weak types respectively from implementing the agreement outcome as recommended, given that both players follow the agreement recommendation; and the right-hand-sides are the posterior expected payoffs from forcing the conflict outcome. That is, the constraints (2.2) ensure that the feasible mediator's probabilities q = (q S , q M , q W ) are chosen so that these probabilities induce posterior beliefs of the players generating the recommended outcome, whether it is agreement or conflict.
The above consideration implies that the interim IR constraints (2.2) and the ex-post IR constraints (5.1) coincide. The conditions (2.2) and (5.1) qualitatively correspond to the IR constraints in BW and HMS respectively. Therefore, the BW constraints and HMS constraints are essentially equivalent in my setting. In this sense, considering a Bayesian bargaining problem as the basic setup is simply a shortcut to focus on the problem of mediator selection with or without the possibility of mediator's enforcement power or binding contracts.
Note that this equivalence also holds without the normalization of the conflict outcome payoffs. For a simple illustration, consider the interim IR constraint for the strong type of player 1, with un-normalized conflict payoffs, given by:
where the left-hand-side is the expected utility from participating in µ q (and truthfully reporting), and the right-hand-side is the expected utility in the conflict outcome. The condition (5.2) can be rewritten as:
which is equivalent to the ex-post IR constraint for the strong type of player 1 given by:
for all q such that p(1 − q S ) + (1 − p)(1 − q M ) > 0.
Multiple Agreement Outcomes and Consideration of Transfers
The analysis for the bargaining setting described by Γ generalizes to the setting with more than one agreement outcome; that is, , and hence a type s player receives One caveat is that the amounts of transfers are bounded above according to the property (ii) in my model with multiple agreement outcomes. That is, I do not consider cases where
when t i = s and t −i = w for some i ∈ {1, 2} and for some d ∈ D \ {d 0 }.
In terms of the example in Table 1 , it corresponds to when the utility payoffs for (s, w) and (w, s) from d 2 are (b, 10 − b) and (10 − b, b) with any b ≥ 7, instead of (6, 4) and (4, 6), more general environments will be studied in future work.
Noncooperative Mediator-Selection Games
Although the neutral bargaining solution concept used in this paper illuminates why we should expect to see an ex ante inefficient mediator arise endogenously in the selection process, one might still wonder in what exact conduit the informational concerns lead to the NBS mediator. I do not formalize a noncooperative mediator-selection game in the current paper, but I can still examine the logical foundations for the results by comparing the reasoning for the inscrutable intertype compromise behind the neutral bargaining solution to strategic incentives that may arise in noncooperative games generally construed.
The cooperative idea of inscrutable intertype compromise inherent in the neutral bargaining solution has a signaling component: Every player "pretends" to be strong and inscrutably "picks" in a cooperative sense the mediator that is most favorable to the strong type; but this is effectively asking every player to pool in a way such that no information is revealed.
The nature of this pooling is exactly reminiscent of a pooling equilibrium in signaling games where the strong type can send a credible signal. It is as if the players in the cooperative bargaining problem wanted to "signal" that they were the strong types. The combination of the inscrutability principle and the requirements for intertype compromise generates this kind of built-in signaling distortion in the cooperative game mathematics.
For future research, a fruitful analysis would be to build a noncooperative theory of mediator selection by considering a suitable game form, and to consider a valid equilibriumselection criterion (if there are multiple equilibria) that determines a unique focal equilibrium in which every player expects to choose the NBS mediator. In doing so, one needs to be careful in imposing assumptions on belief updating off-the-equilibrium path.
Remark on the Applications of the Model
In some bargaining situations, the parties might not be able to choose their own mediator for various reasons; such as, historical concerns, conventional practice, social rules and laws, or the fundamental nature of the dispute. Then the parties would be girded with the "exogenously-chosen" mediator, and this mediator may design the mediation process in a way that suits his or her own goal. For example, in cases where the elimination of costly conflicts is important, maximizing the ex ante chances of peace (or agreement) would be the mediator's criterion; but in other cases, it might not be so. Whatever the mediator's criterion is, situations with given mediators are beyond the scope of the present paper. The relevant applications of my model are bargaining cases in which the privately-informed parties choose a mediator by themselves at the interim phase. These cases can be found in numerous conflict situations such as labor-management struggles, commercial disputes, legal disputes, and international disputes.
Concluding Remarks
In this paper, I address which mediator will be chosen in bargaining situations with incomplete information, and whether (and how) an endogenous mediator-selection process leads to inefficiency in interim bargaining. My analysis yields the conclusion that the players with private information endogenously choose the ex ante worst mediator who renders the highest ex ante probability of conflict. The key insight is that, when the different possible types of players have conflicting incentives, the players must make intertype compromise and advocate for a particular mediator without disclosing information about their types. Within the class of benchmark bargaining problems in which the agreement outcome is ex ante efficient but a strong-type player prefers the conflict outcome when matched with a weak-type player, the players are afraid of seeming weak to their adversary in the mediator-selection process.
These incentives imply that the ex ante incentive efficient mediator, which is most attractive to the weak player, will not be chosen; but in fact the most ex ante incentive inefficient mediator, which is most attractive to the strong player, would be selected among all of the interim incentive efficient mediators. The result suggests a novel idea to the long-held debate over the sources of bargaining failure: Although mediation can be used to reduce bargaining failure that arises from information asymmetries, it solves only part of the problem. The endogenous mediator selection inherently leads to a higher risk of conflict and to inefficiency in bargaining situations with incomplete information.
A Appendix A: Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1. The proof here proceeds by steps.
Step 1. Formulation. Because the type sets and outcome sets are all finite, the set of feasible mediators is a convex polyhedron. So by the supporting hyperplane theorem, the definition of an IIE mediator given in the text can be rewritten as: a mediator with mechanism µ q is IIE if and only if there exists some positive utility weights λ(s) and λ(w)
for the strong type and the weak type respectively, such that µ q is an optimal solution to the optimization problem:
Because the objective and constraints are all linear in µ q , this optimization problem is a linear programming problem. Therefore, a Lagrangean function can be formed. Let α(w|s) and α(s|w) denote the Lagrange multipliers for the incentive compatibility (IC) constraints (A.1) and (A.2) respectively, and let β(s) and β(w) denote the Lagrange multiplier for the individual rationality (IR) constraints (A.3) and (A.4) respectively. Note that I adopt a fully symmetric model with symmetric mediators so that I need not distinguish between the two players.
Step 2. Simplification.
1. For any IIE mediator, it must be q W = 0: Note that q W appears in the right-hand-side (RHS) of (A.1), which increases in q W ; and in the left-hand-sides (LHS) of (A.2) and (A.4), which decrease in q W . Therefore, setting q W = 0 increases the value of the objective function only to relax the conditions.
2. Taking into account that q W = 0, the weak type's IR constraint (A.4) never binds for any q M because υ ww > 0. By the complementary slackness condition, β(w) = 0. (The multipliers must be zero for the constraints that do not bind and must be positive for those that bind.)
Taking these into account, the Lagrangean function can be written as:
This function can be simplified to:
These quantities are called the virtual utility payoffs to a player from outcome d 1 when the type profile is t with respect to the utility weights λ and the Lagrange multipliers α and β.
Step 3. Program for computing IIE mediators. With the above setup, the duality theorem of linear programming implies the following result, which is a modified version of the wellknown result in Holmström and Myerson (1983) , stated below without proof.
Theorem A1. A feasible mediator (mechanism) µ q with q = (q S , q M , q W ) is symmetric IIE if and only if there exist vectors λ = (λ(s), λ(w)), α = (α(w|s), α(s|w)), and β = (β(s), β(w) = 0) such that
Conditions (A.7) through (A.9) are the complementary slackness conditions. Conditions (A.10) through (A.12) assert that an IIE mediator must put a positive probability only on the outcomes that maximize the sum of the players' virtual utilities for every type profile.
Note that the virtual utility payoffs from the conflict outcome is zero to any player for any type profile with respect to any λ, α, and β. I have omitted the sum of the virtual utilities in (A.10) and (A.12) because of symmetry. Also, without loss of generality, λ is normalized such that λ(s) + λ(w) = 1. The theorem gives the most tractable conditions for computing the symmetric IIE mediators. Because of tedious technicality involved in computations, I
may omit some calculations.
Step 4. Preliminary derivations for feasibility. Before continuing, I first give the following necessary conditions on q M and q S for a mediator to be incentive feasible.
Proof. (1):
The strong type's IR constraint p(1 − q S )υ ss + (1 − p)(1 − q M )υ sw ≥ 0 can be rewritten in terms of ρ and ν s as: .13) Suppose to the contrary that q M = 0 when ρ/ν s < 1. Then the strong type's IR constraint is violated because the RHS is strictly positive for any q S . (2): The weak type's IC constraint
υ ww can also be rewritten as: .14) Suppose that q S = 0 when ν w /ρ < 1. Then the above constraint is violated because the right-hand-side is strictly positive unless q M = 0.
I briefly give some reasoning behind this result. When ρ < ν S , the strong type's expected gain from conflict against a weak type is higher than its expected loss from conflict against a strong type. So if a mediator never recommends conflict to the mixed dyads (q M = 0), the strong type would rather force the conflict outcome than agree to implement such mediator.
Thus a mediator must choose conflict with some positive probability for the mixed dyads in order to induce the strong type to participate. When ρ > ν w , the expected gain from agreement with a strong type is higher than that with a weak type. So if a mediator sometimes recommends conflict to the mixed dyads while never recommending conflict to the strong dyad, the weak type would rather lie about its type by reporting that it is strong in order to extract the net gain from agreement with a strong type. Therefore, a mediator must also choose conflict with some positive probability for the strong dyad when it chooses conflict with positive probability for the mixed dyads.
Step 5. Preliminary proofs for interim incentive efficiency.
Lemma A3.
(1) For any given ρ, ν s , and ν w , an IIE mediator must always entail q W = 0, and so β(w) = 0. (2) For ρ < ν w , an IIE mediator must have q S = 0.
Proof. (1) Step 6. Characterizations of IIE mediators for ρ < ν s + ν w . Taking into account Lemmas A2 and A3, I now characterize a set of symmetric IIE mediators using Theorem A1.
Case (1) When ν s ≤ ν w .
(a) For ρ < ν s : By Lemma A2, it must be q M > 0. In particular, q M must satisfy (A.13) in order to be feasible, that is, q M ≥ 1 − (1 − q S )(ρ/ν s ). By Lemma A3, it must be q S = 0. I now show that a feasible mediator with any q M ∈ [1 − ρ/ν s , 1] is IIE.
• For q M = 1 − ρ/ν s and q S = 0, the strong type's IR constraint (A.13) is binding, and its IC constraint is slack because the RHS of (A.13) is:
Also, the weak type's IC constraint (A.14) never binds because q M > 0 and ρ < ν s ≤ ν w . So by the complementary slackness condition, α(w|s) = α(s|w) = 0 and β(s) > 0. With q S = q W = 0, the conditions (A.10) and (A.12) are satisfied.
The only condition left to check is (A.11); it must be (A.15) where the last equality follows because µ q puts a positive probability on both outcomes. Then LHS of (A.15) is: A.16) which equals zero only when
where ν * ≡
−υsw υws
. This implies that for mediator µ q with q M = 1 − ρ/ν s , any λ(s) < ρ/(ρ + ν * ), together with α(w|s) = α(s|w) = 0 and β(s) as given above, satisfies the conditions (A.7) through (A.12).
• For q M ∈ (1 − ρ/ν s , 1] and q S = 0, again (A.13) shows that the strong type's IR constraint is not binding. Also, the strong type's IC constraint becomes more relaxed, and the weak type's IC constraint never binds as before. Thus it must be α(w|s) = α(s|w) = β(s) = 0. Then for q M ∈ (1 − ρ/ν s , 1) there exists a unique λ(s) = ρ/(ρ + ν * ) that makes (A.16) equal zero; for q M = 1, to satisfy (A.11), it must be V sw + V ws < 0, which is equivalent to λ(s) > ρ/(ρ + ν * ).
• Further for ρ < ν s , if q M < 1 − ρ/ν s , such mediator is not feasible because the strong type's IR constraint is violated, and so a mediator with any q M < 1 − ρ/ν s is not IIE.
(b) For ν s ≤ ρ < ν w : Because ρ ≥ ν s , the RHS of (A.13) is less than zero and so the strong type's IR constraint never binds. (It is equal to zero when ρ = ν s , but I disregard this corner case when calculating the Lagrange multipliers.) By Lemma A3, it must be q S = 0. I now show that a feasible mediator with any q M ∈ [0, 1] is IIE.
• For q M = 0, along with q S = q W = 0, the IC constraints bind for both types.
Therefore, it must be α(w|s) ≡ α 1 > 0, α(s|w) ≡ α 2 > 0, and β(s) = 0 such that λ(s) together satisfy V ss > 0 and V sw + V ws > 0, that is:
Note that any λ(s) < ρ/(ρ + ν * ) satisfies the above conditions, and α 1 and α 2 depend on λ(s).
• For q M ∈ (0, 1), all of the constraints are not binding; so λ(s) = ρ/(ρ + ν * ), α(s|w) = α(w|s) = β(s) = β(w) = 0 satisfy the conditions.
• For q M = 1, any λ(s) > ρ/(ρ+ν * ), along with α(s|w) = α(w|s) = β(s) = β(w) = 0 satisfy the conditions.
• Further there is no other feasible mediator that could possibly be interim Pareto superior to µ q , because a mediator is IIE for any possible q M ∈ [0, 1], and an IIE mediator must have q S = 0 for ρ < ν w , and q W = 0 by Lemma A3.
(c) For ν w ≤ ρ < ν w + ν s : Again q W = 0 by Lemma A3, but it must be q S > 0 if q M > 0.
• For q M = 0, the strong type's IR constraint (A.13) is trivially satisfied with slack.
Then q S can be set to zero to maximize the objective value, and thus the IC constraints bind for both types. By the same logic as in (b) for q M = 0, this mediator is IIE.
• For q M ∈ (0, 1), by Lemma A2 it must be q S > 0. An IIE mediator would set q S as small as possible to bind the weak type's IC constraint (A.14). Therefore it must be q S = q M (1 − ν w /ρ) ≤ q M . Then, rewriting the strong type's IC constraint (A.1) gives:
which is not binding because q M ≥ q S and q M ∈ (0, 1). Plugging in q S , the LHS is 1 − (1 − q S )V ss = max{V ss , 0} = 0;
Therefore, such λ(s) and α(s|w), together with α(w|s) = β(s) = 0, satisfy the conditions in Theorem A1.
• For q M = 1, it is q S = (1 − ν w /ρ). The binding constraint is the same as before.
So any λ(s) > λ * , together with α(s|w) = λ(s)ν * /ν s and β(s) = 0, satisfies the conditions.
• I have considered all possible values of q M to be interim incentive efficient, where the feasibility restricts q S to being uniquely determined by q M ; and interim incentive efficiency requires q W = 0. Thus, all mediators characterized in Proposition 1 Case (1) are the only IIE mediators.
The proofs are exactly analogous to the proofs in Case (1). It suffices to show the lower bound on q M for * (b). This lower bound is restricted by feasibility. Since ν w ≤ ρ < ν s , it must be q M > 0 and q S > 0 by Lemma A2. The lower bounds on q M and q S are simultaneously determined by both the binding strong type's IR constraint (A.13) and the binding weak type's IC constraint (A.14):
For any q M > q M , q S is uniquely determined given q M . For such mediator that recommends conflict with the probabilities of these lower bounds, it must be α(s|w) > 0 and β(s) > 0, whereas α(w|s) = 0. (Note that (A.1) is not binding because q M ≥ q S , where equality holds when ν w = ρ, and a strong player gets strictly lower (1 − p)(1 − q M )υ sw by reporting honestly instead of (1 − p)ν sw by lying for q M > 0.) Now to satisfy (A.10) and (A.11), it must be
Thus, for any λ(s) < λ * , together with α(s|w) and β(s) as given above and α(w|s) = 0, a mediator with q M , q S , and q W = 0 is IIE. Any mediator with q M > q M is also IIE as long as q W = 0 and q S is determined according to q M . This proof follows the same logic as the proof in Case (1) (c). Further for any q M < q M , a mediator is not feasible and thus not IIE.
Therefore, all mediators characterized in Proposition 1 Case (2) are the only IIE mediators.
Step 7 . To see this, first note that µ q with q M = 0 gives a strictly higher interim expected utility to the weak type than any other µ q with q M ∈ (0, 1], that is:
which trivially follows because υ ws > 0, 1
Also for the strong type, the following holds:
where the inequality is strict for ρ > ν s + ν w . To see this, rearranging and rewriting the above inequality in terms of ρ, ν w , and ν s gives:
which holds for any q M > 0 when ρ ≥ ν s + ν w . Therefore every type of every player would prefer µ q with q M = 0 over µ q with any q M ∈ (0, 1]. That is, any mediator who recommends conflict to the mixed dyads (and correspondingly to the strong dyad) is not IIE, and the mediator with q S = q M = q W = 0 is the only symmetric IIE mediator when ρ ≥ ν s + ν w .
Proof of Proposition 2. Note that for any ρ given ν s and ν w , q M can be used as the only relevant statistics to uniquely identify an IIE mediator within the set of all symmetric IIE mediators. Let µ q be an IIE mediator with q M and µ q be another IIE mediator with q M . We can easily see from (3.6) that Q(µ q ) < Q(µ q ) if and only if q M < q M , where the corresponding q S and q S are such that q S < q S and q W = 0 to satisfy interim incentive efficiency. The ex ante evaluations of µ q by any player is given by (3.7). Then for any two IIE mediators µ q and µ q ,
if and only if q M > q M , because υ ss > 0 and υ sw + υ ws > 0. Otherwise the LHS would become less than or equal to zero because if q M ≤ q M , then the corresponding probabilities to the strong dyad are also q S ≤ q S . Also, when ρ < ν w so that q S = 0, U (µ q |s) =
(1 − p)υ sw = pυ ss νw+νs−ρ ρ > 0 when ρ < ν w + ν s . Thus Q(µ q ) < Q(µ q ) if and only if U (µ q |s) < U (µ q |s). The interim evaluation of an IIE mediator µ q by the weak type is given by U (µ q |w) = p(1 − q M )υ ws + (1 − p)υ ww , which unambiguously decreases in q M because υ ws > 0. Therefore, Q(µ q ) < Q(µ q ) if and only if U (µ q |w) > U (µ q |w).
Proof of Corollary 1. The proof follows from Proposition 2. I only check that there is a unique ex ante incentive efficient mediator. Proposition 2 states that the symmetric IIE mediators can be strictly ordered by the ex ante evaluations in terms of the ex ante probability of conflict. This ordering implies that the IIE mediator associated with the lowest value of q M for each ρ would give both players the maximum ex ante expected utilities. Obviously, there is no other feasible mediator that gives a higher ex ante expected utility to the players.
All of the other mediators in the set of IIE mediators are ex ante Pareto dominated by this unique ex ante incentive efficient mediator.
Proof of Proposition 3. The unique NBS mediator is obtained by the following characterizations theorem, which is suitably modified and simplified to fit into the class of bargaining models that I consider in this paper, and stated without proof. The proof for a general version can be found in Myerson (1984b) . My modification is the addition of the two types' IR constraints (and the corresponding Lagrange multipliers) in the conditions for the theorem.
Also, the conditions below already incorporate β(w) = 0 and q W = 0, which must be true for all IIE mediators in my setting.
Theorem A3. A symmetric mediator (mechanism) µ q with q = (q S , q M , q W ) is a neutral bargaining solution for Γ if and only if, for each positive number ε, there exist vectors λ = (λ(s), λ(w)), α = (α(w|s), α(s|w)), β = (β(s), β(w) = 0), and = ( (s), (w)) (which may depend on ε) such that
where V ss , V sw , V ws , and V ww are the virtual utility payoffs to any player from outcome d 1 , defined in (A.5); α(w|s) and α(s|w) denote the Lagrange multipliers for the IC constraints; and β(s) denotes the Lagrange multiplier for the strong type's IR constraint, whereas β(w) = 0. Moreover, (λ, α, β) satisfies the interim incentive efficiency conditions in Theorem A1.
The proof of Proposition 3, using the above theorem, involves linear programming techniques in computing the set of all possible "distorted" welfare weights. The computations of the weights and multipliers (λ, α, β) that satisfy the interim incentive efficiency conditions can be found in the proof of Proposition 1. To characterize the neutral bargaining solution, it suffices to check whether there exists a vector = ( (s), (w)) that together with This condition gives (w) = (1 − p)υ ww , and such (w) satisfies (A.22) for the case of ε = 0, which implies that the condition will be satisfied for every positive ε.
• Any symmetric IIE mediator with q = (q S = 0, q M ∈ (1 − ρ/ν s , 1), q W = 0) is associated with λ(s) = ρ/(ρ + ν * ) and α(w|s) = α(s|w) = β(s) = β(w) = 0. The condition (A.19) for the strong type is:
(ρ/(ρ + ν * )) (s)/p = p(ρ/(ρ + ν * ))υ ss /p.
It follows that (s) = pυ ss . Then the condition (A.21) is violated for any ε <
(1 − p)(1 − q M )(−υ sw ) given any q M ∈ (1 − ρ/ν s , 1). Thus, these mediators are also not in the set of neutral bargaining solutions.
• There is only one symmetric IIE mediator to be considered as a neutral bargaining which is a contradiction because υ sw < 0 and υ ww > 0. Therefore, there does not exist (s) that satisfies the conditions in Theorem A3 for ε ∈ (0, − (pυ ss + (1 − p)υ sw )) for any λ(s) < ρ/(ρ + ν * ). Thus an IIE mediator with q = (q S = 0, q M = 0, q W = 0) is not a neutral bargaining solution.
• Any symmetric IIE mediator with q = (q S = 0, q M ∈ (0, 1), q W = 0) is associated with λ(s) = ρ/(ρ+ν * ) and α(w|s) = α(s|w) = β(s) = β(w) = 0. By the same logic as before there is no (s) that satisfies (A.21) given any ε < (1−p)(1−q M )(−υ sw ) for any q M ∈ (0, 1). So these mediators are also not the neutral bargaining solutions.
• For symmetric IIE mediator with q = (q S = 0, q M = 1, q W = 0), it must be λ(s) > ρ/(ρ + ν * ) and α(w|s) = α(s|w) = β(s) = β(w) = 0. Analogous to (a), α = (0, 0), β = (0, 0), and = (pυ ss , (1 − p)υ ww ) along with any λ(s) > ρ/(ρ+ν * ) satisfy all of the conditions for the case ε = 0. Then, the same λ, α, β, satisfy the conditions for every positive number ε. Thus the mediator µ q with q = (q S = 0, q M = 1, q W = 0) is the unique neutral bargaining solution for ν s ≤ ρ < ν w .
(c) For ν w ≤ ρ < ν w + ν s :
• By the same logic as in (b), a symmetric IIE mediator with q = (q S = 0, q M = 0, q W = 0) is not a neutral bargaining solution.
• Any symmetric IIE mediator with q = (q S = q M (1 − ν w /ρ), q M ∈ (0, 1), q W = 0)
is associated with λ(s) = λ * (characterized in
Step 6 (1 − λ * + λ * ν * /ν s ) (w)/(1 − p) = (1 − p) (1 − λ * + λ * ν * /ν s ) υ ww /(1 − p).
From the two equations, is uniquely solved out as (w) = (1 − p)υ ww and . Therefore, these mediators with q = (q S = q M (1 − ν w /ρ), q M ∈ (0, 1), q W = 0) are also not in the set of neutral bargaining solutions.
• For a symmetric IIE mediator with q = (q S = (1−ν w /ρ), q M = 1, q W = 0), it must be λ(s) > λ * , α(w|s) = 0, α(s|w) = λ(s)ν * /ν s , and β(s) = β(w) = 0. Condition (A.19) must hold, that is:
[λ(s) (s) − λ(s)ν w υ ss (w)] /p = 0, because max{V ss , 0} = 0 (q S > 0 so that V ss = 0) and max{(V sw + V ws )/2, 0} = 0 (q M = 1 so that V sw + V ws )/2 < 0). Also (A.20) must hold, that is:
(1 − λ(s) + λ(s)ν w υ ss ) (s)/(1 − p) = (1 − p) (1 − λ(s) + λ(s)ν w υ ss ) υ ww /(1 − p).
From the above two equations, I obtain (w) = (1 − p)υ ww and (s) = (1 − p)ν w υ ss . These (s) and (w) satisfy (A.21) and (A.22) together with any λ(s)
such that λ(s) > λ * , α(w|s) = 0, α(s|w) = λ(s)ν * /ν s , and β(s) = β(w) = 0 for the case of ε = 0; and so the same λ, α, β, and will also satisfy the conditions for every positive ε. Thus, the mediator with q = (q S = (1 − ν w /ρ), q M = 1, q W = 0)
is the unique neutral bargaining solution when ν w ≤ ρ < ν w + ν s .
Case (2) When ν s > ν w .
Analogously as in the proof of Case (1), I can show that the unique neutral bargaining solution for each corresponding range of ρ is exactly as characterized in Proposition 3. Because the logic and the steps of the proof are redundant, I do not expound on it here. The detailed computations of (λ, α, β, ) are available on request. This completes the proof.
